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ABSTRACT 
Major investments in infrastructure rehabilitation have been undertaken by govemments, 
development banks and donors in developing countries in recent decades. In Sub-Saharan Africa 
road deterioration is perceived to be one ofthe main causes for the limited supply response after 
price liberalization in agricultural markets. Studies of the quantitative effects on marketing 
margins are rare. This analysis shows that the wholesale - producer food price margin is 
strongly influenced by the quality of the road infrastructure. Evidence from Zaire shows that 
food prices decrease faster than transportation costs increase and that traders' wages are higher 
on bad roads. A trader's model incorporating uncertainty in input costs is used to explain this 
phenomenon. 
• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Producer-wholesale margms m Sub-Saharan countries are large compared to other 
continents1• These high margins in Africa affect the cost of food, reduce the area in which it 
is marketed and favor the use of imported food. Two major factors determine the producer ­
wholesale margin: transportation costs and transaction costs. Recent research has shown that 
long distance road transport in three African countries was about five times as expensive as 
in Pakistan (Hine, Rizet, 1991; Bonnafour, 1993). Poor road infrastructure increases 
transportation costs, but this is not the only factor. The institutions through which the food 
collection is organized also generate costs, i.e. transaction costs. In a recent study Binswanger 
et al. (1993) conclude that "the major effect of roads is not via their impact on private 
agricultural investment but rather on marketing opportunities and reduced transaction costs 
of all sorts" (p. 364). Worsening of infrastructure decreases the velocity of diffusion of price 
information, with a negative impact on price integration. Hence, given that information flows 
are the key to transaction costs, these costs are also expected to be affected by deterioration 
or improvement of infrastructure. 
Previous research on the impact of marketing infrastructure on agriculture concludes 
that road quality has a positive effect on market integration (Goletti, 1994), increases the use 
of fertilizer (Ahmed, Hossain, 1990), and enhances agricultural output with an elasticity of 
about 0.20 (Binswanger et al., 1993). Using intercountry comparisons, Antle (1983) shows that 
1 •Ahmed and Rustagi (1983) measure price spreads in food grain markets in five African 
and four Asian countries and they find that the ratio of the average producer prices to 
consumer prices ranges from 30 to 60 percent in African countries compared to 75 to 90 
percent in Asia. 
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about 0.20 (Binswanger et aI., 1993). Using intercountry comparisons, Antle (1983) shows that 
transport and communication infrastructure is an important constraint on agricultural 
productivity in developing countries. Goetz (1992) and de Janvry et al. (1991, 1992) argue that 
due to transaction costs a household specific price band exists for the same commodity 
between the effective price received for items sold and the effective price paid for a purchased 
item. The poorer the infrastructure, the greater the size of the band. Gersovitz (1989, 1992) 
shows how agricultural policy, i.e. panterritorial pricing, affects transport investment strategies 
and illustrates how an integrated analysis of tax and price policy would be necessary to assure 
optimal government policies. 
In this paper, food price behavior from the producer to the wholesale level is studied. 
First, the determinants of the magnitude of the transport cost margin and the producer share 
is studied. Second, we look to see if (and to what extent) transport costs are transmitted to the 
producer in a liberalized environment. The incidence of transport costs determines how the 
benefits (costs) of a transport improvement (worsening) are shared between the producer and 
other economic agents, i.e. transporters, middlemen, and consumers. Third, transaction costs 
are analyzed as determinants of remuneration for the transaction costs caused by search, 
gathering, monitoring, bargaining, etc., of the itinerant traders, who buy the bulk of 
agricultural products in rural areas. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the food gathering and transportation 
system in Zaire is described. Section three deals with theoretical considerations. The next 
section discusses data and methodology. Section five discusses the empirical results while the 
-

paper followed by conclusions. 
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE FOOD GATHERING AND TRANSPORTAnON SYSTEM 
A. Infrastructure 
With its vast area of 2.3 million km2, Zaire's road network is 145,000 km in length of 
which the rural network constitutes 104,000 km. In addition to the road network, Zaire has 
16,000 km of navigable rivers. Most of the road network is in bad condition, with important 
sections almost impassable and access to some interior areas severely curtailed. Rural roads are 
maintained by local authorities who have neither the resources nor the organizational capacity 
to carry out the task. Depending on the product, transport costs make up one quarter to one 
third of the wholesale price of domestic products. The poor condition of rural roads has been 
blamed for this transportation cost and for the lack of competitiveness of domestic food supply 
compared to food imports (World Bank, 1988; Shapiro, Tollens, 1992). Despite enormous 
possibilities, food transport by river is less important than by road. The Department of Public 
Works estimated in 1984 that 61 percent of the food supply for Kinshasa arrived by road, 36 
percent by river and 3 percent by railway. Figure 1 shows the main food supply channels to 
Kinshasa. 
• 
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B. Marketin~ System 
The gathering and transportation of local food products is in the hands of different 
types of traders: a. small itinerant traders2, sometimes producers, without own means of 
transport (called "par-colis";) b. transporters with own means of transport (their own or 
rented); c. formal firms with regional offices and stores which sell consumer goods; the owners 
are often of Portuguese nationality; d. Non governmental organizations which sell products 
in stores in Kinshasa outside the typical markets; e. agro-businesses, which buy agricultural 
products for their employees or as inputs for their production process; f. parastatals or the 
government (especially the army) which buys food for their employees. Although no data are 
available on the significance of these different channels, it is commonly accepted that, except 
for maize or rice, most trade is in the hands of the small itinerant traders and that their 
importance has grown over time, especially since the zairianization process began in recent 
years (Goossens et al., 1994). The importance of the itinerant trader is also explained by the 
dominance of small farmers in rural areas3, whose demand for marketing services is most 
easily met by small traders. A profile of these itinerant traders is given in Tables 1 and 2. 
2 Itinerant traders are defined as traders who rent space on a truck, buy agricultural 
products in rural areas, and sell their merchandise, in the city on the parkings of trucks or in 
the port. 
3 Thorbecke (1992) observed this phenomenon in Pakistan. On average, farmers sold 31 
-
percent of their marketed surplus to beoparis, i.e. the itinerant trader. The smallest farms 
(under 2.5 acres) sold 61 percent of their marketed surplus to itinerant traders, while this was 
only 15 percent for farms over 25 acres. 
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Figure 5.1: The Main Food Supply Roads and Rivers to Kinshasa
 
~ . 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Composition of Wholesale Price 
27 10Transportation cost (% of the wholesale price) 
Profit (% of the wholesale price) 34 16 
Producer Share (% of the wholesale price) 39 15 
Managerial capabilities 33 7 
Age (years) 
Experience in the job (years) 
6 5 
53 90 
Characteristics load 
Number of sale units 
988 1983 
Value total load (1000 Z) 4 4 
20 11 
Transport Costs 3 5 
Days on the road 10 9 
Days on the river 2 3 
Days for the gathering of products - truck 3 4 
Days for the gathering of products - boat 3 2 
Days for selling products - truck 3 1 
Days for selling products - boat 262 115 
Number of trips a month - truck 42 60 
Number of trips every six months - boat 
Average distance road type 1- truck (km) 
Average distance road type II - truck (km) 
Average distance - boat (km) 
653 293 
Table 1:	 Mean Values and Standard Deviation of the Main Variables with Respect to the 
Itinerant Trader 
-
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Table 2: Characteristics of Itinerant Traders Expressed as a Percentage of All Itinerant 
Traders 
% of itinerant traders 
Mana&erial Capabilities 81 
Male 
Education: 19 
- Primary School 51 
- Secondary school unfinished 16 
- Diplome d'Etat 10 
- Professional school 4 
- University 10 
Producer themselves 76 
Trader during the whole year 8 
Trader on occasion 
12 
Transaction Costs 13 
Buy always at the same producer 12 
Travel always with the same transporter 37 
Sell always to the same retailers 39 
Sell always on the same parking 85 
Sell often on the same parking 8 
Paid cash for sale 86 
Paid cash to transporter before departure 33 
Paid cash for purchase 68 
Buy always at the same place 78 
Only commercial links 
Original from the same region as producer 48 
42 
Market Conditions 23 
Bought on a rural market 31 
Arrange price with other itinerant traders 
Fixed producer price by government 71 
Losses on the trip 95 
Transport Costs 57 
Transport by truck 10 
Pay taxes on parking 10 
3 
Product 5 
Who sell mainly cassava chips 4 
Who sell mainly peanuts 3 
Who sell mainly maize 4 
Who sell mainly bananas 
Who sell mainly palm oil 
-
Who sell mainly cassava chikwangue 
Who sell mainly cassava pate 
Who sell mainly tomatoes 
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III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section presents a simple model of the itinerant trader system in a one-product, 
static, spatial, and closed economy. We assume one urban center and one rural area, at distance 
d from the urban center, characterized by identical producers. The itinerant trader's cost 
consists of three components: a. the cost of funds to buy food (purchase price P); b. 
transaction costs (search costs, bargaining costs, supervision costs, etc. denoted by 1); c. 
transportation costs; d. Transportation costs are exogenous and increase with distance, i.e. 
aD/ad> o. Transportation costs are also dependent on a "quality of the road" parameter a. 
The itinerant trader has to solve the following profit-maximization problem: 
Maxn n WqM(P) - n(P + D(d,a) + 7)qJ..P) 
where n is the number of producers he has to deal with (the size of his clientele), W is the 
wholesale price in the urban center and 'lM is the quantity marketed by the producer. It is 
assumed that the price elasticity of supply is strictly positive (aq,./ap > 0) and that the 
underlying production function is a Leontief function such that no substitution between farm 
products and marketing and transaction services occurs. The choice variable is the size of the 
clientele of the itinerant trader. The first term in the maximand is the total revenue that the 
itinerant trader can make from a clientele of n producers. The second term reflects his costs. 
Under perfect competition and certain input prices, the zero profit condition holds: 
W - P - D(d,a) - T = 0 
In equilibrium, total marketed supply is equal to demand: 
• 
,­
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where demand is a function of the wholesale price and it is assumed that aQDlaW < o. N is 
the number of itinerant traders. The last two equations are the conditions for a competitive 
market equilibrium with P and W as the endogenous variables. 
A. The Effect ofDistance 
We derive the effect of a change in d, i.e. the distance of the supply center from the 
urban center, on the endogenous variables. Taking derivatives of the equilibrium conditions 
with respect to d, solving for the unknowns and converting to elasticities, produces the 
following results: 
€DFQ?D 
fWd = > 0 
€Q"p - €QowSP 
€DtfQowSD 
€Pd = < 0 
€Q"p - €QowSP 
where €ij is the elasticity of i with respect to a change in j and So and Sp are the shares of the 
transportation cost and the producer price in the final wholesale price respectively. 
Comparative statics produces clear results. An increase in distance increases the wholesale price 
in the urban center, reduces the producer price and hence, reduces the quantity marketed. The 
magnitude of the effect depends on the supply and demand elasticities and on the share of the 
producer price and transportation cost in the final wholesale price. 
Transportation costs affect both consumers and producers. However, they might be 
affected differently as shown in the previous equations. If we define :4 as the part of the • 
increase in the margin borne by the producer due to an increase in transportation costs, i.e. 
9 
then, it can be shown that (see Fisher, 1981): 
Hence, the more inelastic supply and the more elastic demand, the more farmers will suffer 
from a change in transportation costs and the less consumers are affected. The higher the 
producer share in the final wholesale price, the less weight is borne by the producers. 
B. The Effect of Road Quality 
Assume that there are two types of road: a "good quality" road with a known 
transportation cost D and a "bad quality" road where the transportation cost has an uncertain 
cost but a known distributions: 
D - N(D,(J1) 
The impact of uncertain input costs can be found following the logic used in Sandmo (1971) 
for uncertain output prices. As defined before, the profit function is: 
1r(n) :::; nWqM - n(D + P + 1)qM 
Using the utility function 
-

S Practical examples of uncertainty include heavy rainfall destroying the road, trucks 
stuck on the road and blocking it, broken bridges, road toll blocJs.s by soldiers, etc.. 
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u(-n) with ul('ll-}>O and ul/(7l") <0 
the expected utility of profit is 
The first and second order conditions for optimal resource allocation are: 
The first order condition is used to show that (see Minten, 1995): 
E{u 
'
(7l")(qJW - P - 1) - q,fl)} > 0 
Since u'(7l") is non-negative by assumption and intuition, this implies that W-P-T > D at the 
optimum. In other words, expected utility is maximized when the wholesale price exceeds the 
expected costs. This is in contrast to the case of certain input costs where W-P-T would equal 
D. 
Invoking the mean variance approximation, the magnitude of this difference can be 
quantified. Using the utility function u(7l") - u(E(7l")), the first order condition of the 
maximization problem becomes: 
where V(7l") is the variance of profits. This implies that 
• 
The term in square brackets is the ratio of the marginal effects of profit variance and expected 
profit on utility - that is, the rate of substitution in utility terms ,!f expected profit for profit 
11 
oE(7r) [ou(.) / ou(.) ] oV(7r) = 0 
---an + oV{7r) oE{7r) an 
variance. Using the same logic as in Anderson et al. (1977) and substituting in expressions for 
oE(7r)/on and oV(7r)/on, this results in: 
- oV(n)D = (W - P - 7) - R[(W - P - 7)2__] 
an 
The optimum is achieved when the mean transportation cost exceeds the wholesale price 
minus transaction and purchase costs by an amount determined by R, i.e. the "risk evaluation 
differential quotient"\ the marginal variance of output and (W-P-T) squared. The difference 
between the factor costs and the expected value marginal product is sometimes termed the 
marginal risk deduction. Hence, the introduction of uncertainty in input prices induces an 
increase in the trader's margin. 
In the empirical part, the determinants of producer shares and transport costs margins 
are looked at. The transmission of transportation costs to producer prices for different road 
qualities is tested, i.e. 
where d is distance. Since W is fixed and P is the only endogenous variable that changes in a 
cross-sectional analysis, this constitutes a test of the proposition derived from the assumption 
of uncertain input prices. Complete transmission (the Ho hypothesis) implies that transaction 
• 
~"R= _[ ou(.) / ou(.) ] 
oV(7r) oE{7r) 
12 
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costs per unit do not change significantly with distance. In this case, the area where products 
are marketed is larger compared to the case when per unit transaction costs would increase 
with respect to distance. In a last analysis, the impact of distance and road quality on the 
itinerant trader's wage (w) as a remuneration for these transactions costs is looked at. Days on 
the road, days to search and days to sell products are taken into consideration in the 
calculation of a daily wage. For each road quality the following hypotheses are tested: 
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Data 
A survey in Kinshasa (Zaire) was conducted in October - November 1990. The survey 
was carried out by a research team from the K.U.Leuven (Belgium) in collaboration with the 
Department of Markets, Prices and Rural Credit (DMPCC) and the Study and Planning Unit 
(SEP), both within the Ministry of Agriculture. 1405 itinerant traders were surveyed, 1000 on 
the parkings of trucks and 405 in the port. In the beginning of 1990, an exhaustive list of the 
truck parkings was established. 55 parkings were identified where the number of arrivals of 
trucks varied between 0.5 and 12 a day. The sampling plan was established as follows. The first 
stage was to regroup parkings that were in the same neighborhood and supplied the same retail 
markets. The second phase was to conduct a stratification by number of arrivals a day. The 
three strata were: 1. more than 5 trucks a day; 2. 3 to 5 trucks a day; 3. less than 3 trucks a 
day. In each stratum, one third of the parkings were randomly selected and the number of • 
13 
questionnaires was determined by the average daily arrival of trucks. One itinerant trader per 
truck was randomly chosen and interviewed. 
B. Estimation Procedures 
Transportation Costs and Producer Share 
The objective is to estimate a transport margin and a producer share function. In this 
function, all explanatory variables related to the margin itself are included. We relate the 
transportation margin (OM) and the producer share (PS) to the observed data in the following 
expressIOn: 
where DIU is the transportation cost for commodity k at place i, PIU is the producer price for 
commodity k at place i and Wk the wholesale price for commodity k in Kinshasa. 
Since each is a ratio of two values, each is automatically expressed in real terms and a 
general price rise has no effect on the transportation margin or producer share7• The 
functional relationship between the ratio and its arguments are commodity and place specific: 
-

7 Since monthly inflation soared to 100 percent during the survey period, this is a 
particularly important characteristic. 
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DMki = f(A i, 1';, ZJ 
PSki = g(A i, 1';, MEi, ZJ 
where A are transport related costs, T transaction costs, ME producer market environment 
conditions, and Z product dummies. These equations are estimated in a seemingly unrelated 
regressIOn system (SUR) to improve efficiency because of contemporaneous correlation. 
However, since explanatory variables in each equation are overlapping, gains from the 
generalized least squares compared to ordinary least squares are limited. 
Distance enters into the transport margin function because larger trade margins are 
expected for longer routes and smaller margins for shorter routes and vice-versa for producer 
prices. Distances are measured using the 1988 map of the "Institut Geographique du Zaire". 
The distance from Kinshasa to the loading point is proxied using the distance in kilometers 
from Kinshasa to the capital of the administrative zone. Road conditions are taken into 
consideration by constructing two categories: paved roads (type I) and dirt roads (type 11). 
Distances along rivers are not differentiated for accessibility given their rather homogeneous 
situation. This specification allows us to estimate how different types of roads influence the 
marketing margin and how road transport costs compare to river transport costs. Tomek and 
Robinson (1990) observe that transportation costs per km often decline as the distance traveled 
increases. Thus, the cost of moving commodities between two points is often not a linear 
function of the distance. To account for this, a logarithmic form with respect to distance is 
used. 
Correction for particular market conditions is done through the use of a dummy 
variable for price arrangements by the itinerant trader, selling on a market or in the village, 
• 
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8 
and price fixing by the government8• The influence of transactions costs is measured through 
dummy variables that take into account the existence of a personalized system of exchange or 
a credit system between buyer and seller. The fact that the trader is a producer or full-time 
trader might allow him to perform transactions more or less efficiently. The transportation 
margin and producer price are commodity dependent and it is expected that commodities 
which are perishable or which have a high volume to weight ratio are characterized by a 
higher transportation margin and a lower producer price. 
Since independence, Zaire's agricultural producer policy can be divided into three 
periods. In the period from 1960 to 1967, the government set a ceiling price each agricultural 
season and traders were not allowed to buy at a higher price than this imposed one. This 
system was also practiced during the colonial period and its purpose was to keep urban food 
prices low. From 1967 to 1983, the maximum price policy was converted to a minimum price 
policy. Under this policy, the traders were not allowed to offer a price lower than a bottom 
price imposed by regional authorities each season. The purpose was to protect farmers' income 
as shown in the following quote of the Ministry of Agriculture (SEP, 1990): "Le systeme de 
prix minima permet d'eviter la chute des prix ex-ferme en dessous de couts de production 
consentis, particuliecement au cours de la campagne du produit considere." Agricultural 
marketing was liberalized from 1983 on and no prices were officially set by the government 
although the government still intervened in determining "la campagne de commercialisation", • 
i.e. in setting dates when farmers are allowed to start selling their products after harvest. 
However, price setting at the local level in remote parts of the country continued even after 
1983. 
16 
Transport Price Transmission 
The hypothesis that transport prices are transmitted to producers (and transactions costs 
and profits do not change) holds if R/3 = r, i.e. 
[0
1/[1 1] ] = [0] for J = 1,2,3
02j 
where Oij is the coefficient j of the distance variable in equation i. j = 1,2,3 is an indication of 
road type I, road type II and river while i= 1,2 is the producer price and transportation price 
share equation respectively. A way to develop a test statistic for testing 110: R/3 = r against H 1: 
R/3 .. / r is to use an extended version of the single equation F-test. Assuming the errors are 
normally distributed, an expression for Af can be derived Gudge, 1988): 
A= ~ -F 
'f (y _ X~)'(L-l l8l /)(y - Xm/{MT - K) (J,MT-K) 
where the system of equations is: 
y = X(3 + € 
and T is the number of observations, M is the number of equations, K is the number of 
regressors, J is the number of restrictions, I: l8lI is the covariance matrix, and 
It can be shown that the denominator converges in probability to one and hence can be 
•
omitted, leaving
 
as a new operational statistic that has an approximate FO,MT-Kj distribution Gudge, 1988).
 
17
 
The Wa&e of the Itinerant Trader
 
The daily wage (w) of the itinerant trader is defined as follows:
 
where j is product j, q is the number of units bought by the itinerant trader, W,D, and Pare 
the wholesale price, transportation cost and purchase price respectively and do, ~, and ds are 
the days for transport, gathering, and selling of the merchandise. The empirical relationship 
with the wage as the dependent variable is as follows: 
w = heM, Ai' T;, MEJ 
Managerial capacities (M) are proxied by variables for the age, education level, 
experience on the job, gender (which might reflect a different access to information), and full-
time, part-time trader or producer. A Mincer-type earnings function is estimated to incorporate 
potential level-off effects after a certain period on the job. The other variables (transport, 
transaction, and market environment) retain the same meaning as in the previous expressions. 
v. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Producer Share and Transportation Cost Share Determinants and Its Transmission 
-

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the seemingly unrelated regression model of the two 
equations with the ratio of the purchase price and transport price over the wholesale price in 
18 
percentage as dependent variables. The system weighted R2 has a reasonably high value for a 
cross-sectional analysis. To test for multi-collinearity of the variables, Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIFs) and condition-indices are calculated. The kilometers on road type I and on the 
river show a high correlation for both equations (VIFs for these coefficients in all cases are 
larger than 20; conditions indices are larger than 20t For the other variables no severe multi­
collinearity is present. 
As the magnitude of the distance coefficients is of particular importance for this study, 
it was decided to run separate regressions for itinerant traders on trucks and on boats as there 
is no degree of freedom problem. This solves the multi-collinearity problem. The results for 
the distance coefficients are shown in Table 5. All distance coefficients are significant at the 
1 percent level and in the three cases producer prices drop faster than transport costs increase. 
100 extra kilometers on the river increases the transportation share by 0.16 percent. Shipping 
by boat is the cheapest way to transport food. In this case, food prices also decrease at a slower 
rate compared to road transport. Road conditions clearly influence the transport margin. 
Transport on road of type II is three times more expensive than transport on road of type I. 
100 extra kilometers of type II road increase the transport-wholesale price ratio by 3 percent 
while this figure drops to 1 percent on paved roads. 
•The itinerant trader is traveling by boat or by truck which implies zero kilometers on 
the road and a positive number for kilometers on the river or vice-versa. This causes a strong 
negative correlation between these distance coefficients. 
19 
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Table 3: Regression Results for the Ratio of Transport Costs to the Wholesale Price (in 
%) as Dependent Variable (SUR Model)' 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard error t - value 
Intercept 
Transport 
Days on the trip 
Kilometers on river· 
Kilometers on road type r 
Kilometers on road type rr 
Total value (106 Z) 
Return merchandise (l-yes;O-no) 
Breakdown truck (l-yes;O-no) 
Always same parking (l-yes;O-no) 
Often same parking (l-yes;O-no) 
Dummy transaction costs 
13.95 
0.03 
1.12 
2.78 
1.24 
-0.29 
-0.30 
0.29 
-1.96 
-2.30 
2.60 
0.03 
0.40 
0.46 
0.13 
0.17 
0.51 
0.61 
0.62 
0.60 
5.36 
1.07 
2.77 
6.03 
9.61 
-1.74 
-C.59 
0.47 
-3.15 
-3.86 
(l-yesjO-no) 
Same transporter -0.20 0.47 -0.43 
Cash payment to transporter 0.81 0.79 1.03 
Producer 
-0.27 1.15 -C.23 
Full-time trader 
Market Conditions (l-yesjO-no) 
1.33 
1.75 
-0.79 
0.51 
0.47 
0.47 
2.60 
3.69 
-1.70 
Losses 
Sold on a rural market 
Dummy different products 
(O ­ Cassava chips) 
Peanuts -3.83 0.81 -4.74 
Maize -2.59 0.89 -2.90 
Plantains -6.91 1.86 -3.72 
Bananas -4.87 1.83 -2.66 
Palm oil 1.77 1.07 1.66 
Cassava chikwangue -1.67 1.31 -1.27 
Cassava paste 4.77 1.39 2.72 
Tomatoes 2.48 1.22 2.04 
Beans -5.19 3.26 -1.60 
Gourd 
-5.52 2.16 -2.55 
Sesame -12.01 2.65 -4.54 
Other 
-4.27 1.83 -2.33 
Re~ression Statistics 
Number of Observations 1360 
Adjusted R2 (OLS) 0.35 
System Weighted R2 0.35 
II: results only for itinerant traders with a strictly positive transport and purchase price 
*: in logarithm 
-
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Table 4: Regression Results for the Ratio of the Purchase Price to the Wholesale Price 
(in %) as Dependent Variable (SUR Model)' 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard error t - value 
Intercept 
Transport 
Kilometers on river" 
Kilometers on road type r 
Kilometers on road type rr 
Total value (106 Z) 
Return merchandise 
Dummy transaction costs 
52.60 
-2.93 
-2.00 
-1.82 
-0.33 
-0.00 
3.84 
0.54 
0.63 
0.18 
0.23 
0.72 
13.71 
-5.38 
-3.15 
-10.20 
-1.43 
-0.00 
(l-yesjO-no) 
Same tribe (region) -0.31 0.77 -0.41 
Always or often same producer 0.04 0.66 0.06 
Only commercial linkages 1.30 0.74 1.75 
Cash payment to seller 1.07 0.93 1.15 
Producer -2.69 1.64 -1.64 
Full-time trader 
Market conditions (1- yesjO ­ no) 
-0.81 
-0.90 
0.71 
0.65 
-1.15 
-1.39Sold on a rural market 
Price fIxing by the govt -0.52 0.47 -1.10 
Price fixing by itinerant traders 
Dummy different products (O-Cassava 
0.03 0.65 -0.04 
chips) 
Peanuts 9.57 1.11 8.62 
Maize 2.86 1.24 2.29 
Plantains -4.67 2.60 -1.80 
Bananas -7.00 2.56 -2.74 
Palm oil 14.75 1.52 9.73 
Cassava chikwangue 11.06 1.83 6.04 
Cassava paste -0.70 1.93 -0.36 
Tomatoes 7.86 1.69 4.65 
Beans 27.27 4.53 6.02 
Gourd 19.34 3.00 6.45 
Sesame 18.50 3.68 5.03 
Other 6.06 2.55 2.38 
Re~ession Statistics 
Number of Observations 1360 
Adjusted R2 (OLS) 0.29 
System Weighted R2 0.35 
II: results only for itinerant traders with a strictly positive transport and purchase price 
*: in logarithm 
-
..­
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Table 5:	 The Impact of Distance on the Producer and Transportation Cost Share 
(Distance in Kilometers in Logarithm and in Levels, Calculated at the Mean) 
and Results from the Hypothesis Test that Distance Coefficients in Both 
Equations are Equal (Separate Regressions for Transport by Boat and by Truck) 
In logarithm Per km, evaluated at the mean F-value Prob>F' 
Producer 
share 
Transponation 
share 
Producer 
share 
Transponation 
share 
I. Road Transpon 
-km on road type I 
-km on road type IT 
IT. River transpon 
-km on the river 
: values In brackets are t-values 
-3.33 
(-4.12)' 
-1.71 
(-9.39) 
-2.88 
(-3.03) 
2.63 
(4.20) 
1.23 
(8.83) 
1.30 
(2.25) 
-0.0127 
-0.0403 
-0.0035 
0.0100 
0.0290 
0.0016 
0.67 
6.33 
2.16 
0.41 
0.01 
0.14 
As explained in the methodology section, a cross-equation constraint was imposed to 
test if transportation costs are transmitted to producer prices for the three transport types 
(road I, road II, river). The hypothesis that transport costs are transmitted to producer prices 
could not be rejected at the five percent significance level as measured by the F-test for road 
type I and for the river (Table 5). If the itinerant trader faces more transportation costs, 
producer prices will decrease to the same extent. Hence, per unit transaction costs do not 
change significantly over distance for these types of transport. The coefficients on the producer 
share are significantly different from the coefficient on the transportation cost in the case of 
road type II. Bad roads not only increase transportation costs but they also increase 
uncertainty and transactions costs significantly. 
Most of the proxies for transaction costs show a logical but statistically insignificant 
effect. Origin from the same region for trader and seller does not influence producer or 
transportation shares significantly while commercial linkages between the trader and the 
producer increase the producer share by 1.3 percent compared to other types of relationship 
-
(family, tribe, religion). Switching costs measured through the fact that the itinerant trader 
" 
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buys always or often from the same producer or travels with the same transporter are not 
significant in the producer and transportation share respectively. The effects of cash payments 
to the producer, rural trader and the transporter and the effects of a full-time trader or 
producer are insignificant or very small. 
Minimum price fixing by the authorities does not significantly affect the purchase price 
and even shows the reverse sign of what would be expected. Price arrangements among 
itinerant traders do not seem to affect purchase price or transport costs. An increase in the 
total value of the merchandise reduces the per unit transport costs, indicating that bigger 
traders may be able to work out better deals with the transporter. Different products show 
significantly different shares of producer prices and transport prices in the final wholesale 
price. Using cassava chips as the benchmark, most products show a higher producer share in 
the final wholesale price. Beans show the highest producer share while perishable products like 
bananas, plantains, and cassava paste show the lowest. 
The Determinants of the Wage of the Itinerant Trader 
Table 6 shows the regression with the logarithm9 of the daily wage as the dependent 
variable10• The R2 of the regression is rather low, i.e. 13 percent, which is not uncommon for 
cross-sectional analysis. The daily wage of the itinerant trader increases the further he goes on 
the river and on the dirt roads. It does not change significantly for paved roads. His daily wage 
increases by 3 percent for every 100 km he goes further on the river while it increases by 42 
percent for every 100 km extra on dirt road. Although transport by boat is significantly 
9 A logarithm was used to reduce the influence of large wages and to facilitate 
interpretation. 
-

10 In this specification, the distance coefficients were expressed in levels which eliminated 
their collinearity problem. Collinearity exists for the experience variable and its square (VIF 
is 7.01 and 5.94 respectively). For the other variables, VIFs were ,below 3. 
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cheaper than by truck, daily wages do not differ much because of the longer time involved in 
trips on boats. The daily wage is strongly related to the size of the itinerant trader. The 
further itinerant traders go, the less competition they face and the more easily they find 
products. The effect is more pronounced on lower quality roads. The fact that the itinerant 
trader increases his average wage on lower quality roads is a reward for the extra risk and 
uncertainty he is exposed to12• 
Managerial capabilities show a strong effect on the wage of the itinerant trader. A 
university degree increases the wage by 56 percent compared to a primary school degree. To 
a lesser but strongly significant extent, these same effects hold for other types of education. 
A 1 year change in age increases the wage by 3 percent. The Mincer-type learning effect is 
insignificant. The wage of the full-time trader is 26 percent higher than the wage of the 
occasional trader while producers earn 42 percent more. However, this last fact is because 
producers do not have to purchase the products they are trading. 
Price collusion by the itinerant traders results in a lower wage while fixing of the 
producer price by the government results in a higher wage. It seems that fixing the minimum 
price benefits the trader more than it does the producer. Trade with the same person (seller, 
transporter, buyer) or within the same tribe as a means to overcome asymmetric information 
has no significant effect on the wage. Cash payment by the consumer or retailer increases the 
wage of the itinerant trader by 40 percent. This seems illogical at first sight because one would 
expect that the cost of credit has to be paid. A potential explanation might be that cash 
payment by consumers or retailers might serve as a screening device of the purchasing power 
of the customer with a stronger bargaining power for the seller. 
-

12 It could be argued that part of this is also due to monopoly and oligopoly rents. 
However, there is no evidence that this would be different for different transport types. 
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Table 6: Regression Results for the Logarithm of the Daily Wage of the Itinerant Trader 
as Dependent Variable 
Intercept 
Mana~erial Capabilities 
Gender (l-male; O-female) 
Age 
Experience 
(Experience)2 
Secondary school education' 
"Dip18me d'Etat"' 
Professional degree' 
University degree' 
Producer (l-yes;O-no) 
Always Trader (l-yes;O-no) 
Transport 
Kilometers on river 
Kilometers on road type I 
Kilometers on road type IT 
Retour merchandise (l-yes;O-no) 
Breakdown truck (l-yes;O-no) 
Dummy transaction costs 
(l-yes;O-no) 
Same tribe (region) as seller 
Same transporter 
Same retailer 
Always or often same producer 
Only commercial linkages 
Cash payment of buyer 
Cash payment of transporter 
Cash payment to seller 
Market conditions (l-yes;O- no) 
Losses 
Sold on a rural market 
Price fixing by the government 
Price fixing by itinerant traders 
Parameter 
Estimate 
7.2812 
-0.0677 
0.0352 
0.0069 
-0.00008 
0.4045 
0.4403 
0.5161 
0.5556 
0.4177 
0.2644 
0.0003 
-0.0003 
0.0042 
0.1357 
-0.1395 
-0.1410 
0.1258 
0.0305 
-0.0888 
-0.0046 
0.3995 
-0.2172 
-0.0289 
-0.0889 
0.0636 
0.1047 
-0.1588 
Standard error 
0.2903 
0.0925 
0.0060 
0.0172 
0.0006 
0.0984 
0.1247 
0.1368 
0.1969 
0.1529 
0.0807 
0.0001 
0.0003 
0.0007 
0.0791 
0.0988 
0.0891 
0.0795 
0.0826 
0.0778 
0.0863 
0.1044 
0.1259 
0.1081 
0.0766 
0.0725 
0.0539 
0.0755 
t • value 
25.08 
-0.73 
5.88 
0.40 
-0.13 
4.11 
3.53 
3.77 
2.82 
2.73 
3.27 
3.52 
-0.83 
6.13 
1.71 
-1.41 
-1.58 
1.58 
0.37 
-1.14 
-0.05 
3.82 
-1.72 
-0.27 
-1.16 
0.88 
1.94 
-2.10 
Re~ression Statistics 
Number of Observations 1383 
R2 0.15 
Adjusted R2 0.13 
- compared to pnmary school or no tormal educatIon 
-
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines the behavior of the producer-wholesale price margin of domestic 
products between the urban center of Kinshasa and the rural areas. Transportation is three 
times more expensive on bad roads than on paved roads. Boat transport is cheapest. Transport 
costs are completely transmitted to producers for all types of transport. However, for bad 
roads not only transportation costs but also uncertainty and other transaction costs increase 
significantly12. Producer prices decrease four times as fast for every kilometer traveled on bad 
roads as compared to good roads. The quantitative pay-off of road improvement on 
agricultural producers is thus significant. The daily wage of the itinerant trader increases 
significantly the further he travels on the river or on dirt roads. The highest pay-off is on dirt 
roads. His average daily wage increases by 40 percent for every 100 km extra. This is probably 
partly due to the cost of the extra risk he is exposed to. 
The transmission of transport costs to producers has several policy implications. First, 
minimum price fixing by the government without additional measures13, the prevalent policy 
in the 70s and the beginning of the 80s, will effectively reduce the area where domestic food 
is sold. Hence, price fixing has a theoretically ambiguous effect. It improves prices for those 
producers that live close to the urban center while producers that live far away are left out. 
Second, road improvement effectively reduces transportation costs, and increases producer 
12 Creightney (1993) puts it this way: "A transport improvement may lower input prices 
and hence production costs, improve access to credit, facilitate technological diffusion, increase 
the area of land under cultivation, or increase the availability of "incentive" goods. Other 
benefits from a transport improvement may include increased trade and competition from 
imports, in turn leading to improved production efficiency, downward pressure on consumer 
prices, and reduced seasonal price fluctuations. Stronger social and economic linkages between • 
rural and urban areas and increased non-farm employment may also develop." 
." 
13 The government itself was not involved in buying or storing agricultural products. 
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prices. Hence, it also increases the area where food is sold and it changes the type of food that 
is sold. Third, securing lower transportation costs through, for example, less interruption in 
the provision of fuel or less taxes on imported trucks, will indeed increase producer prices. 
It has been argued that the use of family and tribal links in marketing is a means of 
reducing asymmetric information. Results from the liberalized food marketing system in Zaire 
show the importance of family and tribal links in determining producer shares, transportation 
shares and wages of itinerant traders is minor. Managerial capabilities as measured by education 
and age are of far greater importance. 
This study has limitations and extensions are possible. First, although assumed constant 
in the model, total transaction costs might increase or decrease with distance and road quality. 
On one hand, uncertainty and supervision costs are expected to rise the longer the trip and 
the worse the road. On the other hand, the itinerant trader may face relatively less bargaining 
and search costs as it is expected that he faces less competition from other traders the further 
he goes and that he might better be able to secure a bigger load. A more extensive model and 
more detailed data would allow this kind of analysis. Second, high inflation during the survey 
may effect results in the wage determinant equation. Third, this analysis focused on the 
Kinshasa market in Zaire. It would be useful if similar studies could be done on other urban 
markets, other countries, and over time. 
-
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